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Document 
No. 237 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION 



Joint Memorandum of December 9, 1919 

British -French Revised Proposals of January 14, 1920 

Statement of the French and British Ministers of Jan- 
uary 23, 1920 

President Wilson's Note of February 10, 1920 

Reply of the French and British Prime Ministers of 
February 17, 1920 

President Wilson's Note of February 24, 1920 




PRESENTED BY MR. HITCHCOCK 
February 27, 1920.— Ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1920 



l>; •* SI- 
MAR IS 1920 



U6: 

■T&A* 
THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 



[For the press.] 

Joint Memorandum of December 9, 1919. 

Department of State, 

February 26, 1920. 

The text of the joint memorandum signed on December 9 by 
Premier Clemenceau for France, Sir Eyre Crowe for England, and 
Undersecretary Frank L. Polk for the United States reads as follows: 

Paris, December 9, 1919. 

The following memoranda were signed by Clemenceau, Crowe, and 
myself at the close of the meeting of the Supreme Council at Quai 
d'Orsay this morning: 

"At the moment when the Peace Conference is entering what it is 
hoped may be the last stage of its labors for the conclusion of peace 
with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the territorial settlement still 
remains incomplete in respect of regions which the (?) uncertainty 
is calculated to effect gravely the vital interests of the countries 
directly involved and might easily endanger the peace of Europe and 
of the world. 

"Being persuaded that this danger could only grow in intensity if 
the Peace Conference were to terminate before an agreement had 
been reached among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 
concerning the Adriatic question, the representatives of the Confer- 
ence of America, Great Britain, and France desire to call the atten- 
tion of their Italian colleague to the urgent necessity of finding a 
solution. They realize fully the difficulties with which the Italian 
Government is confronted in dealing with this problem, but it is 
precisely for this reason that they believe that it would be unjust to 
all the parties concerned, and in the first place to Italy herself, were 
they any longer to delay putting frankly before the Italian Govern- 
ment a statement of the position such as they see it after many 
months of examination and reflection. The friends of Italy therefore 
feel impelled to make a further effort to reach a settlement which 
would be the fulfillment of her legitimate aims and aspirations with 
the equitable claims of the neighboring states as well as with the 
supreme interests of the peace of the world. 

"The three representatives, accordingly, venture to invite the 
Italian Government to proceed to a fresh survey of the field in the 
light of the statement which they have now the honor to make. 

"The British and French representatives have followed with 
earnest and sympathetic attention the negotiations which have 
passed between the Italian Government and the President of the 
United States. If they have hitherto refrained from tendering their 
direct advice to the Italian Government in the matter, it was because 



4 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

they had hoped the Italian Government would he able to reach an 
agreement with President Wilson to which the British and French 
Governments could readily subscribe. It will be remembered that 
the British and French Governments have already, more particularly 
by their note communicated to President Wilson on September 10th, 
used their best efforts to promote such an agreement which the Presi- 
dent's answer to that note gave every reason to hope could be 
brought about. Though a complete agreement has not so far been 
arrived at, the points of difference still outstanding have been so 
much reduced as to justify an expectation that complete accord will 
now be reached. 

"It is well, with this view, to place on record, in the first place, 
the chief points on which agreement has been reached. This is all 
the more desirable, as it would appear from recent official Italian 
statements that some misapprehension may exist in regard to matters 
which can readily be cleared up, such, for instance, as the exact 
description of what is generally referred to as President Wilson's 
line. The points of agreement are, in the main, embodied in the 
American memorandum communicated to the Italian Delegation 
in Paris on October 27th. 

"(1) With regard to Istria, President Wilson had from the first 
agreed to a frontier running from the Arsa River to the Karawanken 
Mountains, which widely overstepped the recognized ethnical line 
between Italy and Yugoslavia and which would have, as a result, to 
incorporate in Italy more than three hundred thousand Yugoslavs. 
Italy's geographical position, as well as her economic requirements, 
was held to justify this serious infringement of the ethnic principle 
and President Wilson, anxious to give the fullest value to these 
important considerations, went still further in agreeing to an exten- 
sion eastward in such a way as to give to Italy the region of Albona in 
spite of the considerable additional number of Yugoslavs thereby 
incorporated. 

''Moreover, to strengthen the strategic security of Italy, President 
Wilson, in agreement with the Italian Government, has indorsed the 
creation of a buffer state between Italian territory in Istria and the 
Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in which some two hundred thousand 
Yugoslavs, as against less than forty thousand Italians, will be 
placed under the control of the League of Nations. Anxious to 
remove any conceivable strategetic menace that Italy might fear 
from the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, President Wilson has agreed, and 
the British and French Governments are glad to associate them- 
selves with this agreement, that the so-called Assling region shall be 
permanently demilitarized. The three representatives would be 
happy to learn from the Italian Government whether slight modifica- 
tion of the demilitarized zone between the Arsa River and Cape 
Promontore are deemed necessary to safeguard the security of the 
defenses on Italian territory. 

"(2) There is complete agreement concerning the creation, in the 
interest of Italy, of the buffer state to be known as the (free state of 
Fiume ?) and its control by the League of Nations. Ethnic con- 
siderations would demand that this state, containing two hundred 
thousand Yugoslavs, should be afforded an opportunity by plebi- 
scite to decide its own fate. In deference to Italy's objection that 
the incorporation of this region in the Serb-Croat-Slovene state bv 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

free act of the inhabitants might create a real menace, it is now 
agreed that the determination of the whole future of the state shall 
be left to the League of Nations, which, in conformity with Italian 
requirements, shall not fail to provide the full measure of autonomy 
which the city of Fiume enjoyed under Austro-Hungarian rule. 

" (3) The three representatives are glad to record their apprecia- 
tion of the wisdom and moderation which have marked the attitude 
of the Italian Government towards the difficult question of Dalmatia. 
They feel that the Italian Government have acted on an enlightened 
view of their higher interests in official^ withdrawing territorial 
claims to an area where, to enforce them, would have meant perma- 
nent discord with the inhabitants of the Serb-Croat-Slovene state 
and prevented all possibility of friendly relations with them. In 
order, however, to safeguard every Italian racial and sentimental 
interest it has been agreed that the city of Zara shall enjoy a special 
regime. Its geographical position indicates Zara as a part of the 
Yugoslavs state, but, provided the town is left within the Yugoslavs 
customs union, it is to be given complete sovereignty under the 
League of Nations and freedom to control its own affairs. 

" (4) .The same wisdom and moderation as that which had marked 
the attitude of the Italian Government towards the Dalmatian ques- 
tion have characterized their attitude as regards the islands in the 
Adriatic. The Italian Government appears to be at one with Presi- 
dent Wilson in realizing the necessary racial, geographic, and polit- 
ical connection of the Dalmatian coastal islands with the Yugoslav 
state. On the other hand, the possession of certain outlying islands, 
though ethnically Yugoslav and economically connected with Yugo- 
slavia, are considered by the Italian Government necessary to Italy's 
strategic control of the Adriatic and the reasonableness of this claim 
has been accepted. The following islands being accorded to Italy 
on a demilitarized status, namely: (a) The Pelagosa group, (b) Lissa 
and the small islands west of it, (c) Lussin and Unie. These islands 
are to pass in full sovereignty to Italy who, on her part, is to make 
an agreement with the Slav population of Lissa providing for their 
complete local autonomy. 

'(5) Italy is to receive a mandate for the administration of the 
independent state of Albania under the League of Nations. Attached 
to the present memorandum is an outline of the form which, in the 
opinion of the three representatives, such a mandate should take. 
The frontiers of Albania on the north and east at present will be those 
fixed by the London, conference in 1913; the southern frontier is 
still a matter for negotiation. In order, however, not to delay a 
general settlement by such negotiations, the following provisional 
arrangement could be adopted: Greece shall occupy the territory 
west and south of a demarcation line which shall run as follows 
(reference one million two hundred thousand Austrian staff map) : 
from Mount Tumba on the northern boundary of Greece northwestward 
along the crest of the Nemercha Ridge to the Vojusa River, thence 
down that river to Teleleni, Mirica to point 98, thence south, passing 
between the villages of Lopsi-Martolozit and Zemblan, thence through 
points 1840 and 1225 to a point about two miles south by east 
1225, thence westward passing just north of Pol j ana, thence southeast 
to point 1669, thence west and northwest to point 2025, thence south- 
westward to the coast just south of Asprhyonruga. The triangle of 



6 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION". 

territory from point 98 on the Vojusa River, between Baba and 
Sinanaj, northeastward to Lake Malik and southward to the Greek 
frontier and the demarcation line mentioned above should be the 
subject of later negotiation between the three Allied representatives 
on the one hand and Italy and Greece on the other, the three Allied 
representatives acting for Albania. 

" (6) The city of Valonia, together with such Hinterland as may be 
strictly necessary to its defense and economic development, is to be 
granted to Italy in full sovereignty. 

"The above six points in their general aspect are those on which, 
after many months' negotiation, the Italy Government have happily 
reached an agreement with the President of the United States. They 
afford to Italy full satisfaction of her historic national aspirations, 
based on the desire to unite the Italian race; they give her the abso- 
lute strategic control of the Adriatic; they offer her complete guard 
against constitutional guarantees against whatever aggressions she 
might fear in the future from her Yugoslav neighbors, an aggression 
which the three representatives on their part consider as most im- 
probable if the lines of a just and lasting settlement are reached. 
They have even carried their concern for Italian security to the 
point of neutralizing the Dalmatian Islands and adjacent waters 
from the northern border of the Ragusa region to Fiume. The three 
representatives therefore venture very earnestly to urge on the 
Italian Government in the most friendly spirit that they should 
reflect on the great advantages which the above settlement following 
on that which gave to Italy the frontiers of the Alps would bring her 
and the great moral and material triumph with which its successful 
conclusions would now provide the Italian Government. 

"Anxious, however, to give the most sympathetic consideration to 
every Italian interest or sentiment, the three representatives have 
carefully examined in all their bearings certain further demands 
which the Italian Government have presented under the following 
four heads: (A) Control by Italy of the diplomatic relations of Zara. 
(B) An arrangement by which the city of Fiume the so-called 
(corpus separatum) should be dissociated from the free State of 
Fiume and made completely independent though its port and railway 
should be left to the free State. (C) Direct connection of the city 
of Fiume (with the?) Italian province of Istria by the annexation 
to Italy of a long narrow strip of territory running along the coast 
from Fiume to Volosca between the railway and the sea, the Italian 
frontier in Istria being pushed eastwards so as to include the whole 
peninsula within Italy. (D) Annexation to Italy of the Island of 
Lagos ta. 

"With regard to the first point, the representation of Zara, there 
ought to be no difficulty in satisfying the national Italian demand that 
this small historic Italian town shall preserve the Italian character 
both in its internal administration and in its representation abroad. 
It is already conceded that (beyond such connection with Yugoslavia 
as Zara shall have by its incorporation in the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
customs union) the city shall be completely independent under the 
League of Nations. The city will therefore be entirely free to decide, 
subject to the approval of the League of Nations, how it shall be 
diplomatically represented abroad. If, as is contended, the city is 
completely Italian, its choice will naturally be made in accordance 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 7 

with the Italian claims; and it is hoped that in this way entire satis- 
faction will be given to the desire of the Italian Government. The 
Italian proposal to withdraw the city of Fiume, except its port, from 
the free state is one which has been found seriously perplexing. The 
main object of the creation of a buffer state between Italy and 
Yugoslavia was precisely to guarantee on the one hand Italian 
strategic security and on the other the prosperity and development 
of Fiume. It is not understood how it would be possible for the so- 
called buffer state to exist without Fiume and still less how it would 
be possible for Fiume to exist except within the buffer state. Fiume 
and the buffer state are absolutely dependent one on the other, and 
any arrangement which removed Fiume from the buffer state would 
put an end to the prosperity alike of the city and of its Hinterland. 
Mindful of the sentimental feeling aroused in Italy by the question of 
Fiume, the three representatives have always believed that a prac- 
ticable plan could be devised whereby the city of Fiume within the 
buffer state should enjoy a privileged position. With this object in 
view they propose for Fiume precisely the same degree of autonomy 
as the city had under Austro-Hungarian rule. It is believed that 
this provision and the watchful and sympathetic interest of the 
League of Nations will guarantee to Italy full protection for the 
Italian ethnic and cultural elements at Fiume. With absolute sover- 
eignty vested in the League of Nations and with Italy represented in 
the council of the League every Italian interest will be fully safe- 
guarded. Moreover, to separate Fiume from the buffer state could 
not fail to lead to a protest against the very establishment of such a 
buffer state, which under such conditions would be inhabited entirely 
by Yugoslavs. With respect to the new Italian proposal for the 
annexation to Italy of a long narrow strip of coast from Fisnona to 
the gates of the city of Amann there are difficulties of a practical 
nature. The reason for which the Italian Government have made 
this demand is stated to be a purely sentimental one — namely, the 
desire that the city of Fiume should not be separated from Italy by 
any intervening foreign country. No doubt such a sentimental reason 
may be of great importance in the eyes of the Italian Government, 
but it would appear to rest on a misapprehension of the real position 
of Fiume. The creation of the buffer state — which is to be com- 
pletely independent of Yugoslavia — was, among other reasons, prob- 
ably intended to safeguard the position of Fiume ; and the free state, 
of which Fiume must, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, form an 
essential part, is already in direct contact with the Kingdom of Italy, 
not only by sea but by a long land frontier of approximately a hundred 
miles. Full effect, therefore, is already given to the sentimental con- 
siderations to which the Italian Government attach so much value. 
In fact, the new Italian plan would not achieve this object so well, as 
in practice it is to be feared that it would be quite unworkable. The 
Italian Government does not propose to interfere with the railway 
connecting Fiume with the north, which they admit is to remain within 
the free state. This railway runs for a considerable distance along 
coast; and the Italian proposal amounts, so far as this region is con- 
cerned, to cutting off from the free state and incorporating with Italy 
the line of sandy and barren beach intervening between the railway 
and the sea. Whilst the injury to the free state, which would in this 
eccentric way be entirely cut off from its only seaboard, is obvious 



8 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

and immeasurable, it is not easy to understand what would be the 
benefit to Italy unless it be considered a benefit to her that the free 
state should be so crippled. Nor does it seem necessary to dwell on 
the extraordinary complexities that would arise as regards customs 
control, coast-guard services, and cognate matters in a territory of 
such unusual configuration. 

"The plan appears to run counter to every consideration of geog- 
raphy, economics and territorial convenience, and it may perhaps be 
assumed that if these considerations were overlooked by the Italian 
Government this was due to their having connected it in their mind 
with the question of annexing to Italy all that remains of the Yugo- 
slav portion of the peninsula of Istria. 

"This question of further annexation of Yugo-Slav territory is 
raised quite unambiguously both by the demand for the whoie of 
[stria and by the proposal to annex the Island of Lagosta. In neither 
case do even considerations of strategy arise, for tne strategical com- 
mand of the Adriatic is already completely assured to Italy by the 
possession of Trieste, Pola, the islands facing Fiume, Pelagos, and 
Valona. Additional security is afforded by the proposed demilitariza- 
tion of the whole free State of Fiume together with a large zone lying 
to the north of it and of the small portion of Istria remaining to the 
free (*) of Fiume. 

"Economic consideration being equally excluded there remains 
nothing but a desire for further territory. Now the territories 
coveted are admittedly inhabited by Yugo-Slavs. They contain 
practically no Italian elements. Tiiis being so it is necessary to refer 
to the way in which President Wilson, with the cordial approval of 
Great Britain and France, has met every successive Italian demand 
for the absorption in Italy of territories inhabited by peoples not 
Italian and not in favor of being absorbed. On this point the follow- 
ing passage may be quoted from a telegram addressed to Signor 
Tittoni by the Secretary of State at Washington on November 12 : 

" 'Your excellency can not fail to recognize that the attitude of the 
American Government throughout the negotiations has been one of 
sincere sympathy for Italy and of an earnest desire to meet her 
demands. Italy claimed a frontier on the Brenner Pass and the 
demand was granted in order to assure to Italy the greatest possible 
protection on her northern front although it involved annexing to 
Italy a considerable region populated by alien inhabitants. Italy 
demanded further a strong geographic eastern frontier and this like- 
wise was granted in order to assure her abundant protection although 
it involved incorporation with Italian boundaries of further territory 
populated by Alien inhabitants. Italy demands the redemption of 
her brothers under foreign Sovereignty and every effort was made 
to meet this wish even in certain cases where, by so doing, much 
greater numbers of foreign races were brought within Italian Sover- 
eignty. Italy demanded complete naval control of the Adriatic and 
this was granted by according her the three keys of the Adriatic: 
Pola. Valona, and a central Island base. When all this failed to 
satisfy Italian claims there was added concession to concession at 
Sextan Valley, at Tarvis, at Albona, in the Lussin Islands, in the 
terms of the Fiume free state and elsewhere. In our desire to deal 
generously, even more than generously, we yielded Italy's demand 
for an Italian mandate over Albania, always hoping to meet from 
Italy's statesmen a generous response to our efforts at conciliation.' 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION". 9 

"To the considerations thus urged by Mr. Lansing the three rep- 
resentatives desire to add another argument. In doing so they trust 
the Italian Government will not credit them with any desire to give 
advice on questions of Italian high policy on which the Italian Gov- 
ernment will rightly claim to be the best judge. But an appeal to 
an historical argument may be permitted to the representatives of 
three countries to whom the liberation of Italian territories from 
foreign domination has been a matter of unwavering concern and 
sympathy through generations of noble and often terrible struggles. 
Modern Italy won the place in the hearts of all liberty loving peoples 
which she has never since lost by the pure spirit of her patriotism, 
which set before her people the generous aim of uniting under the 
Italian flag those extensive provinces formerly within the ancient 
Italian boundaries, which were and have remained essentially Italian 
territories in virtue of their compact Italian population. The sym- 
pathies of the world have accompanied Italy's advance to the outer 
borders of Italia Irridenta, in pursuit of the sacred principle, the 
self-determination of the peoples. This principle is now invoked by 
other nations. Not invariably is it possible owing to the compli- 
cated interaction of racial, geographical, economic and strategical 
factors to do complete justice to the ethnic principle. Small isolated 
communities surrendered and outnumbered by populations of dif- 
ferent race can not in most cases be attached to the territory of their 
own nation from which they are effectively separated. But the broad 
principle remains that it is neither just nor expedient to annex as 
the spoils of war territories inhabited by an alien race, anxious and 
capable to maintain a separate national state of irridentism exactly 
analogous in kind to that which justified the demand of Italia Irri- 
denta for union with the Italian State. 

"The three representatives venture with all deference to express 
the opinion that in declining to agree to the incorporation of more 
Yugo-Slav territory they are acting in the highest interest of the 
Italian nation itself. 

"From this point of view the inclusion in Italy of purely Yugo- 
Slav territories where neither security nor geographical or economical 
considerations compel annexation is not in itself a commendable 
policy. It would be bound to create within the Italian borders a 
compact body. 

' ' The three representatives would make an earnest appeal to the 
Italian Government to seize the present most favorable of oppor- 
tunities for arriving at a friendly agreement with them for the im- 
mediate conclusion and permanent guarantee of the definite settle- 
ment on lines which they venture to think fully realize all the legiti- 
mate national aspirations of Italy, and fully safeguard her preemi- 
nent position in the Adriatic. A settlement based on the founda- 
tions which Italy, in conjunction with her Allies, could thereby lay 
would have given a means of reconciling interest at present divergent 
and of offering Italy an opportunity for rendering more cordial and 
solid her relations with the new nations, who are her neighbors, and 
to whom she could furnish such valuable assistance and economic sup- 
port as her resources and experience entitle her to offer. 

"The spirit of moderation which was characterized in the recent 
attitude of the Italian Government leads the three representatives to 
hope that this appeal from Italy's American, British, and French 



10 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION". 

Allies will not pass unheeded and that the Italian Government will, 
by assuring definite agreement with their Allies, place on firm founda- 
tions the great moral and material triumphs to which Italy's efforts 
and sacrifices throughout the war have so justly entitled her." 

"The United States, British, and French Governments desire to 
recognize the independence of the Albanian State. They consider 
that the State of Albania will require, to the extent indicated in 
paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations, 
'The Administrative advice and assistance' of one of the Great 
Powers. For this task Italy, by her geographical situation and 
economic capacity, is primarily indicated. 

"The United States, British, and French Governments are anxious 
therefore, to entrust to Italy a mandate over the state of Albania 
under the conditions implied in the covenant of the League of 
Nations. They consider that these conditions should form the basis 
of Italy's acceptance of this mandate and should be in a convention 
to be concluded between the Italian Government and the Govern- 
ments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The headings 
of such a convention would be the following: 

"One. Albania is recognized as an independent State within the 
frontiers indicated in the body of the covering memorandum. 

"Nothing in these stipulations shall, however, prevent the Albanian 
State from negotiating with the Serb-Croat-Slovene state such region 
rectifications as may be in accord with local ethnographic and eco- 
nomic requirements. 

"Two. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government shall have the right 
to construct and operate railways through Northern Albania north 
of parallel 41, degrees 15, and otherwise to enjoy full privileges of 
international purport across Northern Albania. 

"Three. The right to control the development of the Boyana river 
shall be vested in the Council of the League of Nations with power 
to delegate the work to either Italy or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State 
under proper restrictions. It is assumed for this purpose that Mon- 
tenegro will form part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. 

"Four. A commission shall forthwith be established consisting of 
a representative of the Italian Government, a representative of the 
League of Nations, and a representative of the Albanian State who 
shall be designated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 
for the purpose of elaborating (A) the terms of the mandate to be 
entrusted to Italy over Albania, and (B) the organization of the future 
state of Albania. This commission shall terminate its labors within 
five months from the signature of this convention and will address a 
report thereon with the necessary recommendation, to the Council of 
the League of Nations. The final decision as to the terms of the 
mandate and the organization shall be made by the Council of the 
League, acting by a majority vote. 

"Five. The Commission foreshadowed in the above paragraph shall 
base its deliberation not only on the considerations above outlined 
but also on the following principles: 

"(A) The freedom of conscience and the free and outward exercise 
of all forms of worship ; the complete liberty in education and lin- 
guistic matters of all the inhabitants of the State of Albania. 

"(B) The organization in so far as may be compatible with the 
tradition of the country and the exercise of efficient administration of 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION". 11 

legislative and administrative bodies representing all sections of the 
population. 

' ' (C) The prevention of the exploitation of the country or its 
colonization in a manner liable to militate against the interests of 
the native inhabitants. Under this heading would be included any 
recommendations which the commission might make as to improve- 
ments in the existing system of land tenure. 

"(D) The eventual creation of gendarmerie the senior officers of 
which may be Nationals of the mandatory power. The mandatory 
power shall have the right for a period of two years from the date of 
which the mandate is conferred and pending the organization of the 
native gendarmerie the request for armed forces in the country. 
After that period the State of Albania shall be permanently demili- 
tarized and no power shall be allowed to maintain regular forces in 
the country without the sanction of the Council of the League of 
Nations." 

British-French Revised Proposals of January 14, 1920. 

The following is a paraphrase of the text of the British-French 
revised proposals, as accepted by Premier Nitti and handed to the 
Jugoslav delegation by Premier Clemenceau on January 14: 

"THE ADRIATIC QUESTION REVISED PROPOSALS HANDED TO THE 

JUGOSLAV DELEGATES BY M. CLEMENCEAU ON THE AFTERNOON OF 
JANUARY 14, 1920. 

" (1) There shall be an independent State, under the guarantee of 
the League of Nations, consisting of the corpus separatum of Fiume. 
The right of this independent State to choose its own diplomatic 
representation shall be accorded. The Serb-Croat-Slovene State shall 
be given the town of Susak, it being understood that the railways 
terminating there, together with all facilities for their development, 
and the whole port as well, are to be handed over and to belong to 
the League of Nations which will take into consideration the interests 
of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Hungary, Transylvania, as well as 
the city itself, and will make arrangements accordingly. 

" (2) The Free State (of the previous proposals) shall disappear and 
the boundary shall be so drawn between Italy and the Serb-Croat- 
Slovene State as to meet the following requirements : 

"(A) To provide along the coast a connection by road within 
Italian territory. This, however, shall be done in such a manner as 
to leave within the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the whole of the rail- 
way from Fiume northward through Adelsberg. Where the railway 
from Fiume follows the coast, the boundary line shall lie between the 
railroad and the corridor joining Fiume with Italy. 

"(B) A readjustment of the Wilson line in the region of Seno- 
secchia in order to provide for the protection of Trieste. 

"(C) The boundary line to be further drawn as marked by the blue 
line on the map attached. This will leave in the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
State purely Jugoslav districts. 

"3. There shall be an independent State, under the guarantee of 
the League of Nations, consisting of Zara, within the limits of the 
municipality. The right of this independent State to choose its own 
diplomatic representation shall be accorded. 



12 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

"(4) Valona shall be retained by Italy, as provided for in the 
Treaty of London, and, in addition," the mandate over Albania shall 
be given to Italy. In northern Albania, the boundaries shall be re- 
adjusted as shown on the attached map. Those districts of Albania 
which will thus go to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State will enjoy a 
special regime as an autonomous province similar to that which the 
treaty with the Czechoslovak republic provides for its autonomous 
provinces. The southern boundary of Albania shall be the line 
which was proposed by the British and French delegations on the 
Commission on Greek Affairs. This leaves Greece Koritza and 
Argvrokastron. 

"(5) There shall be asigned to Italy the following island groups: 
Lussin, Lissa, and Pelagosa. There shall be placed under the sover- 
eignty of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the remainder of the islands. 

" (6) All Adriatic islands shall be demilitarized. 

"(7) There shall be special provisions permitting Italians in Dal- 
matia to choose, without leaving the territory, Italian nationality. 

"(8) Economic enterprises now existing in Dalmatia shall by an 
international convention have their security safeguarded." 

The following is the text of the cable sent on January 19 by the 
Secretary of State, asking the point of view of the British and French 
Governments in undertaking to dispose of the Adriatic and Russian 
questions before ascertaining the views of the American Government : 

"Washington, January 19, 1920. 

"Please take up with Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd-George the 
question of the way the Russian and the Italian problems have been 
handled and ascertain their point of view. The United States is 
being put in the position of having the matter disposed of before 
the American point of view can be expressed, as apparently Mr. 
Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd-George have sought only the views of the 
Italian and Yugo-Slav Governments before ascertaining the views of 
the United States Government. Is it the intention of the British 
and French Governments in the future to dispose of the various ques- 
tions pending in Europe and to communicate the results to the 
Government of the United States ? There are features in connection 
with the proposed Fiume settlement which both Mr. Clemenceau and 
Mr. Lloyd-George must realize would not be acceptable to the Presi- 
dent. 

"As it was pomted out by Mr. Polk before his departure, the Dal- 
matian and other questions should be taken up through regular 
diplomatic channels and the fact that you are not charged with full 
powers could have no bearing on the question. As no American offi- 
cial could be sent to these gatherings that could have the same au- 
thority as the Prime Ministers of the three Governments in question, 
it is manifestly impossible for the United States Government to be 
represented at the meetings of the Prime Ministers. 

(Signed) "Lansing." 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 13 

Statement of the French and British Prime Ministers of 

January 23. 

The text of the reply of the British and French Prime Ministers to 
the preceding cable reads as follows: 

"Paris. 

"His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments 
to His Excellency the United States Ambassador and has the honor 
to state that he has been charged by Mr. Lloyd-George and M. 
Clemenceau to hand to Mr. Wallace the enclosed telegram drawn 
up by Mr. Lloyd-George and M. Clemenceau before their departure. 
In reply to the telegram from Mr. Lansing, which Mr. Wallace handed 
to Mr. Lloyd-George and M. Clemenceau on the 20th instant, Lord 
Derby would be grateful if the telegram now enclosed could be 
transmitted to Mr. Lansing at the earliest opportunity." 

The telegram reads as follows: 

"The French and British Prime Ministers have given their careful 
attention to the memorandum communicated to them by the Ameri- 
can Ambassador in regard to the Russian and Italian negotiations. 
As to the Russian question, they had previously sent a statement of 
their views for the consideration of the United States Government 
inviting their consent and cooperation. 

"As regards the Italian question, the absence of the United States 
has never been regarded by the French and British Governments 
as more than temporary and they have never lost sight of the Ameri- 
can point of view on this question, on the right solution of which the 
future of the world so largely depends. The French, British, and 
Japanese Governments have never had the intention of making a 
definite settlement of the questions raised without obtaining the 
views of the American Government. They therefore took up the 
Adriatic question at the point at which it was left on the departure 
of Mr. Polk for Washington. Signor Nitti transmitted certain pro- 
posals in modification of the joint memorandum handed to Signor 
Scialoja by the request from the United States, France, and Great 
Britain on December 9th, 1919. On the assembly of the conference 
in Paris a fortnight ago M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd-George imme- 
diately resumed negotiations between the Italian Government and 
the representatives of Jugo-Slavia and finally arrived at what they con- 
sidered an arrangement which was the best available reconciliation 
of the Italian and Jugo-Slav points of view. The details of this 
settlement are appended. The French and British Governments 
are glad to think that practically every important point of the joint 
memorandum of December 9th, 1919, remains untouched and has 
now been indorsed by the Prime Minister of Italy. Only two fea- 
tures undergo alterations, and both these alterations are to the posi- 
tive advantage of Jugo-Slavia. 

"1. The free state of Fiume which would have separated two hun- 
dred thousand Jugo-Slavs from their fatherland disappears. Three 
quarters of these people are at once and forever united with Jugo- 
Slavia, a source of perpetual intrigue and dispute is done away with, 
and if in return Jugo-Slavia has to agree to the transfer of territory 
to Italy including some 18,000 Jugo-Slavs in addition to those already 
included under the Wilson proposals. The balance is clearly to the 



14 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

benefit of Jugo-Slavia. Fiume becomes an independent state under 
the guarantee of the League of Nations and the authority of the 
League of Nations over the port becomes absolute and immediate in 
the interests of all concerned. 

"2. As regards Albania, an attempt has been made to afford satis- 
faction to the necessary requirements of all parties concerned. The 
details of the administration of this country by Jugo-Slavia, Italy, and 
Greece have yet to be elaborated but in working to his end, sight 
will not be lost of the feelings and future interests of the Albanian 
people and every endeavor will be made to carry out the arrangements 
in full consultation with them. The French and British Govern- 
ments consider that the above is a fair settlement of a difficult and 
dangerous question and have informed Italian, Jugo-Slavs Govern- 
ments that in the event of its not being accepted they will be driven 
to support the enforcement of the Treaty of London which is satis- 
factory to nobody. Had a plenipotentiary representing the United 
States Government been in Paris, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd- 
George would have cordially welcomed his full cooperation in this 
negotiation, but in the absence of anyone who could speak on behalf 
of "the United States and in view of the vital importance of arriving 
(*) the settlement of a question which has inflamed southeastern 
Europe for more than a year and which if it is not promptly com- 
posed, may not only impede the recuperation and reconstruction of 
two countries greatly exhausted by the war, but may lead to war 
itself. The Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain felt that no 
other course was open to them but to proceed to dispose as quickly 
as possible of difficulties between two 01 their allies in close and con- 
tinuous consultation with both while they were all in Paris together. 
In doing this they have not intended to show the slightest discourtesy 
to the United States Government nor have they wished to conceal 
their action in any way from the latter. They are indeed sure that 
the President would not have desired them to make a settlement im- 
possible during the necessarily short stay of the Prime Ministers in 
Paris by requiring every phase of the negotiations to be communi- 
cated to Washington in order to obtain his consent to the proposals 
when he had not heard the arguments and could not interview the 
principals concerned. In their judgment the only plan was to pro- 
ceed with the negotiation as rapidly as possible and to submit the 
results to the United States Government as soon as a definite con- 
clusion had been reached. 

(Signed) "Wallace." 

President Wilson's Note of February 10. 

On February 10 there was despatched to the British and French 
representatives at Paris a note from President Wilson, the text of 
which is as follows: 

"The President has carefully considered the joint telegram 
addressed to this Government by the French and British Prime 
Ministers and communicated by the American Ambassador in Paris, 
in regard to the negotiations on the Adriatic question. The President 
notes with satisfaction that the French, British, and Japanese Govern- 
ments have never had the intention of proceeding to a definite settle- 
ment of this question except in consultation with the American 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION". 15 

Government. The President was particularly happy to receive this 
assurance as he understood that Monsieur Clemenceau and Mr. 
Lloyd-George, in agreement with Signer Nitti, had decided upon a 
solution of the Adriatic question which included provisions previously 
rejected by the American Government, and had called upon the 
Jugoslav representatives to accept this solution, on pain of having 
the Treaty of London enforced in case of rejection. The President is 
glad to feel that the associates of this Government would not consent 
to embarrass it by placing it in the necessity of refusing adhesion to a 
settlement which in form would be an agreement by both parties to 
the controversy, but which in fact would not have that great merit if 
on party was forced to submit to material injustice by threats of 
still greater calamities in default of submission. 

"The President fully shares the view of the French and British 
Governments that the future of the world largely depends upon the 
right solution of this question, but he can not believe that a solution 
containing provisions which have already received the well-merited 
condemnation of the French and British Governments can in any 
sense be regarded as right. Neither can he share the opinion of the 
French and British Governments that the proposals contained in 
their memorandum delivered to the Jugoslav representatives on 
January 14th leave untouched practically every important point of 
the joint memorandum of the French, British, and American Govern- 
ments of December 9, 1919, and that 'only two features undergo 
alterations, and both these alterations are to the positive advantage 
of Jugoslavia.' On the contrary, the President is of the opinion 
that the proposal of December 9th has been profoundly altered to 
the advantage of improper Italian objectives, to the serious injury of 
the Jugoslav people, and to the peril of world peace. The view that 
very positive advantages have been conceded to Italy would appear 
to be borne out by the fact that the Italian Government rejected the 
proposal of December 9th and accepted that of January 14th. 

"The memorandum of December 9th rejected the device of con- 
nection Fiume with Italy by a narrow strip of coast territory as quite 
unworkable in practice, and as involving extraordinary complexities 
as regards customs control, coast guard services, and connate matters 
in a territory of such unusual configuration. The French and British 
Governments, in association with the American Government, ex- 
pressed the opinion that 'the plan appears to run counter to every 
consideration of geography, economics and territorial convenience.' 
The American Government notes that this annexation of Jugoslav 
territory by Italy is nevertheless agreed to by the memorandum of 
January 14th. 

"The memorandum of December 9th rejected Italy's demand for 
the annexation of ali of Istria, on the solid ground that neither strate- 
gic nor economic considerations could justify such annexation, and 
that there remained nothing in defense of the proposition save 
Italy's desire for more territory admittedly inhabited by Jugoslavs. 
The French and British Governments then expressed their cordial 
approval of the way in which 1 ho President had met every successive 
Italian demand for the absorption in Italy of territories inhabited 
by peoples not Italian and not in favor of being absorbed, and 
joined in the opinion that, 'it is neither just nor expedient to annex 
as the spoils of war territories inhabited by an alien race.' Yet this 



16 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

unjust and inexpedient annexation of all of Istria is provided for in 
the memorandum of January 14th. 

"The memorandum of December 9th carefully excluded every 
form of Italian sovereignty over Fiume. The American Government 
can not avoid the conclusion that the memorandum of January 14th 
opens the way for Italian control of Fiume's foreign affairs, thus 
introducing a measure of Italian sovereignty over, and Italian 
intervention in, the only practicable port of a neighboring people: 
and, taken in conjunction with the extension of Italian territory 
to the gates of Fiume, paves the way for possible future annexation 
of the port by Italy, in contradiction of compelling considerations 
of equity and right. 

"The memorandum of December 9th afforded proper protection 
to the vital railway connecting Fiume northward with the interior. 
The memorandum of January 14th establishes Italy in do:) limiting 
military positions close to the railway at a number of critical points. 

"The memorandum of December 9th maintained in large measure 
the unity of the Albanian state. That of January 14th partitions 
the Albanian people, against their vehement protests, among three 
different alien powers. 

"These and other provisions of the memorandum of January 14th, 
negotiated without the knowledge, or approval of the American 
Government, change the whole face of the Adriatic settlement, and, 
in the eyes of this Government, render it unworkable and rob it of 
that measure of justice which is essential if this Government is to 
cooperate in maintaining its terms. The fact that the Jugoslav 
representatives might feel forced to accept, in the face of the alter- 
native of the Treaty of London, a solution which appears to this 
Government so unfair in principle and so unworkable in practice, 
would not in any degree alter the conviction of this Government 
that it can not give its assent to a settlement which both in the terms 
of its provisions and in the methods of its enforcement constitutes 
a positive denial of the principles for which America entered the war. 

"The matter would wear a very different aspect if there, were any 
real divergence of opinion as to what constitutes a just settlement of 
the Adriatic issue. Happily no such divergence exists. The opin- 
ions of the French, British, and Americans as to a just and equitable 
territorial arrangement at the head of the Adriatic Sea were strikingly 
harmonious. Italy's unjust demands had been condemned by the 
French and British Governments in terms no less severe than those 
employed by the American Government. Certainly the French and 
British Governments will yield nothing to their American associate 
as regards the earnestness with which they have sought to convince 
the. Italian Government that fulfillment of its demands would be 
contrary to Italy's own best interests, opposed to the spirit of justice 
in international dealings, and fraught with danger to the peace of 
Europe. In particular, the French and British Governments have 
opposed Italy's demands for specific advantages which it is now 
proposed to yield to her by the memorandum of January 14th, and 
have joined in informing the Italian Government that the conces- 
sions previously made ' afford to Italy full satisfaction of her historic 
national aspirations based on the desire to unite the Italian race, 
give her the absolute strategic control of the Adriatic, and offer her 
complete guarantees against whatever aggressions she might fear in 
the future from her Jugoslav neighbors.' 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 17 

"While there is thus substantial agreement as to the injustice and 
inexpediency of Italy's claims, there is a difference of opinion as to 
how firmly Italy's friends should resist her importunate demands for 
alien territories to which she can present no valid title. It has seemed 
to the President that French and British associates of the American 
Government, in order to prevent the development of possibly danger- 
ous complications in the Adriatic region, have felt constrained to go 
very far in yielding to demands which they have long opposed as 
unjust. The American Government, while no less generous in its 
desire to accord to Italy every advantage to which she could offer 
any proper claims, feels that it can not sacrifice the principles for 
which it entered the war to gratify the improper ambitions of one of 
its associates, or to purchase a temporary appearance of calm in the 
Adriatic at the price of a future world conflagration. It is unwilling 
to recognize either an unjust settlement based on a secret treaty the 
terms of which are inconsistent with the new world conditions, or 
an unjust settlement arrived at by employing that secret treaty as 
an instrument of coercion. It would welcome any solution of the 
problem based on a free and unprejudiced consideration of the merits 
of the controversy; or on terms of which the disinterested Great 
PoM r ers agreed to be just and equitable; Italy, however, has repeatedly 
rejected such solutions. This Government can not accept a settle- 
ment the terms of which have been admitted to be unwise and unjust, 
but which it is proposed to grant to Italy in view of her persistent 
refusal to accept any wise and just solution. 

"It is a time to speak with the utmost frankness. The Adriatic 
issue as it now presents itself raises the fundamental question as to 
whether the American Government can on any terms cooperate with 
its European associates in the great work of maintaining the peace of 
the world by removing the primaiy causes of war. This Government 
does not doubt its ability to reach amicable understandings with the 
Associated Governments as to what constitutes equity and justice 
in international dealings; for differences of opinion as to the best 
methods of applying just principles have never obscured the vital 
fact that in the main the several governments have entertained the 
same fundamental conception of what those principles are. But 
if substantial agreement on what is just and reasonable is not to 
determine international issues; if the country possessing the most 
endurance in pressing its demands rather than the country armed 
with a just cause is to gain the support of the powers; if forcible 
seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and condoned, and is to 
receive ultimate justification by creating a situation so difficult that 
decision favorable to the aggressor is deemed a practical necessity ; 
if deliberately incited ambition is, under the name of national senti- 
ment, to be rewarded at the expense of the small and the weak; if, 
in a word, the old order of things which brought so many evils on 
the world is still to prevail, then the time is not yet come when this 
Government can enter a concert of powers the very existence of 
which must depend upon a new spirit and a new order. The Amer- 
ican people are willing to share in such high enterprise; but many 
among them are fearful lest they become entangled in international 
policies and committed to international obligations foreign alike to 
their ideals and their traditions. To commit them to such a policy 

S. Doc. 237, 66-2 2 



18 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

as that embodied in the latest Adriatic proposals, and to obligate 
them to maintain injustice as against the claims of justice, would 
be to provide the most solid ground for such fears. This Govern- 
ment can undertake no such grave responsibility. 

"The President desires to say that if it does not appear feasible to 
secure acceptance of the just and generous concessions offered by 
memorandum of those powers of December 9th, 1919, which the 
the British, French, and American Governments to Italy in the joint 
President has already clearly stated to be the maximum concession 
that the Government of the United States can offer, the President 
desires to say that he must take under serious consideration the 
withdrawal of the treaty with Germany and the agreement between 
the United States and France of June 28, 1919, which are now before 
the Senate and permitting the terms of the European settlement to 
be independently established and enforced by the Associated Govern- 
ments. 

(Signed) "Lansing." 

Reply of the French and British Prime Ministers of 

February 17. 

The text of the memorandum signed by the Prime Ministers of 
France and Great Britain in reply to President Wilson's communica- 
tion of February 10 reads as follows : 

"London, February 17, 1920. 

"The Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain have given their 
earnest attention to the communication made to them in regard to 
the Adriatic settlement on behalf of President Wilson; they are glad 
that the Government of the United States has set forth its views so 
fully and with such complete frankness; they do not, however, find 
it altogether easy to understand the steps by which the Government 
of the United States has arrived at its present attitude. 

"In the first place they believe that there is no foundation for the 
assumption which underlies the American communication that the 
proposed settlement outlined in their telegram of January 20 involves 
a capitulation to the Italian point of view as opposed to the Yugo- 
slav and therefore constitutes a settlement with which the Govern- 
ment of the United States can have nothing to do. The memoran- 
dum from the United States Government criticises the proposed 
settlement on four grounds. 

" Firstly, that it cedes to Italy the narrow strip of territory running 
along the coast as far as the Corpus Separatum of Fiume. 

"Secondly, that this strip of territory coupled with the constitution 
of Fiume as a Free city, under the guarantee of the League of Nations 
clearly paves the way for its annexation to Italy. 

"Thirdly, that the modification of the Yugo-Slav-Italian frontier 
operates to the detriment of Yugo-Slavia in its control of the northern 
railway from Fiume and ; 

"Fourthly, that it provides for the partition of Albania. The 
memorandum of the Government of the United States would appear 
to have entirely ignored the great advantage conferred on Yugo- 
slavia at the same time. 

"The origin of the proposal of January 20 lies in the fact that when 
the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France came to deal directly, 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 19 

both with the representatives of Italy and Yugo-Slavia in Paris, they 
found that nobody desired to protect Free State of Fiume, which had 
always been an essential part of the American proposals for settle- 
ment. They discovered that Yugo-Slavia would approve settlement 
which did away with the Free State including, as it does, a population 
of 200,000 Slavs and included as much as possible of its territory and 
population within its own borders. Accordingly the Governments of 
France and Great Britain continuing the negotiations from the point 
at which they had been left on December 7, made the proposal, under 
discussion, including the rectification of the Wilson Line and the 
cession to Italy of a strip of territory running along the shore so as to 
connect it with the Free City of Fiume. The net upshot of which was 
that Yugo-Slavia was to gain as compared with the American proposal 
an additional 150,000 Yugo-Slavs. While agreeing to the inclusion 
within the Italian frontier of a further 50,000 Yugo-Slavs in addition 
to the 400,000 which President Wilson had already agreed to allot 
to that country. 

"As regards the suggestion that the proposal of January 20 clearly 
paved the way for the annexation of the town of Fiume to Italy, the 
French and British Governments cannot possibly accept the implica- 
tion that the guarantee of the League of Nations is worthless and that 
the Italian Government has no intention of abiding by a Treaty which 
it enters into. As regards the railway, the proposal of January 20 
gives to the Yugo-Slav state the control of the whole line from the 
point where it leaves the port of Fiume, which is under the control of 
the League of Nations. This railway is a commercial and not a 
strategic railway. Under President Wilson's proposals it is com- 
manded by Italian guns. According to either plan nothing could be 
easier than for Italy to cut it in the 'event of war. They do not, 
therefore, see that there is substance hi this criticism, a proposal 
who.se real effect is to transfer the whole railway to Yugo-Slavia 
instead of leaving it in the hands of the Free City of Fiume which no 
one desires. 

"There remains the question of Albania. They are glad to receive 
the criticism of the American Government on this part of their pro- 
posal. They would point out, however, that their telegram of Jan- 
uary 20 states that "The details of the administration of this country 
by Tugo-Slavia, Italy, and Greece have yet to be elaborated and in 
working to this end sight will not be lost of the feelings and future 
interest of the Albanian people, and every endeavor will be made to 
carry out the arrangements in full consultation with them.' Further, 
they would point out that so far from this proposal being made in the 
interests of Italy it was made in the interests of Jugoslavia. The 
Jugoslavs pointed out that though under the proposal of January 20 
the northern part of their territory was guaranteed adequate access 
to the sea through the port of Fiume, the southern part of Yugo- 
Sla ia had no such access and that the national outlet was to build 
a line down the Drin River to the mouth of the Boy ana River. The 
French and British Governments thought that there was force in this 
contention, and their proposal in regard to Albania was designed to 
enable Yugo-Slavia, inasmuch as Albania was unable to undertake 
the work for itself, to develop, under international guarantee, a rail- 
way, have never been able to establish a settled government for them- 
selves, and as the northern part of the population is overwhelmingly 



20 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

Christian and the southern part similarly Mohammedan they thought 
it best to entrust the responsibility for government and development 
of these two parts to Yugo-Slavia and Italy, respectively. They 
have, however, agreed that the whole of Albania should be brought 
under the mandatory system, and they believe that this will make it 
possible eventually to satisfy aspirations of the Albanian people for 
unity and self-government. 

"The Governments of Great Britain and France therefore must 
repeat that they find difficulty in understanding the present attitude 
of the United States Government towards the proposals and they 
hope that in view of these explanations that Government will see 
its way to reconsider its attitude. In their view, these proposals are 
the natural outcome of the policy of the joint memorandum of 
December 9, once, with the consent of both parties concerned, the 
idea of the Free State of Fiume was abandoned in view of the absence 
of the American representatives they had no option but to attempt 
to settle this question by themselves. It is not, however, the desire 
of the two governments to force a settlement which is unacceptable 
to the President of the United States, and they will therefore not 
attempt to insist upon its acceptance until they have heard the view 
of the United States Government on this dispatch. They have 
confined themselves, therefore, to asking the Yugo-Slav Government 
to give a definite answer to their memorandum of January 20, since 
they must know what the attitude of that Government is. 

"They feel bound, however, to ask the United States Government 
to consider the effect of their action. The proposal of December 
ninth has fallen to the ground because nobody now wants to set up 
the artificial Free State of Fiume. The proposal of January twen- 
tieth is objected to by the United States, which had no representative 
at the deliberations and which cannot therefore be in close touch 
with the changes of opinion and circumstances which have taken 
place since its plenipotentiaries returned to America. They cannot 
help feeling that a large part of the misunderstanding is attributable 
to the difficulty of reaching a common understanding. In such 
circumstances how does the United States Government, which, to 
the regret of the Allies, still has no plenipotentiaries at the conference, 
propose that this dispute, which prevents the reconstruction and 
threatens the peace of southeastern Europe and whose settlement is 
urgently required, should ever be closed ? 

"Further, the British and French Governments must point out 
that the fears to secure an agreed settlement between Italy and 
Jugoslavia must leave them no choice but to acknowledge the val- 
idity of the Treaty of London, they would recall to the United States 
Government that the Treaty of London was entered into in the 
spring of 1915, at a most critical and dangerous moment of the war. 
In thus entering the war on the side of human freedom, Italy made 
a condition that the Allies should secure for her, as against Austria- 
Hungary, strategic frontiers which would guarantee her ( ?) reten- 
tion by the Central Powers of the strategic command of the northern 
plains of Italy had the Austro-Hungarian Empire remained in ex- 
istence as the ally of Germany the provisions of the Treaty of London 
would have been sound. Relying upon the word of her allies, Italy 
endured the war to the end. She suffered a loss in killed of over 
500,000 men, and in wounded of three times that number, while her 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 21 

people are burdened by crushing debt. It was clearly impossible for 
her allies to declare at the end of the war that their signature to the 
treaty meant nothing but a scrap of paper and that they did not 
intend to apply the time their bond. They agreed with President 
Wilson that these circumstances under which the Treaty of London 
were concluded had been transformed by the war itself, the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire had disappeared and the menace to Italy against 
which the terms of the treaty were intended to provide had largely 
diminished. They therefore entirely associated themselves with the 
efforts of President Wilson to negotiate a settlement between Italy 
and Yugo-Slavia which would be consonant with the new conditions 
and which was acceptable to both sides. But throughout these pro- 
posals they never concealed from hirn the fact that they regarded 
themselves as bound by the Treaty of London, in the event of a 
voluntary agreement not being arrived at. The fact, therefore, that 
when they made their proposals of January 20 they informed both 
the Italian and the Jugo-Slav Governments that, in the event of 
their not being accepted, they would have no option but to allow 
the Treaty of London to come into force, can have come as no sur- 
prise, and was indeed the obvious method of bringing this long 
controversy to a close. They would point out that this declaration 
is not, as the American Government would appear to think, an 
ultimatum to Yugo-Slav on behalf of Italy. Under the Treaty of 
London, Italy has had to abandon Fiume altogether and hand it 
over to Yugo-Slav. This part of the Treaty is as unacceptable to 
Italians as is the transfer of Dalmatia and the islands to Yugo-Slav. 
The declaration, theiefore, in regard to the enforcement of the Treaty 
was an attempt to promote a prompt settlement of this dangerous 
controversy by pointing out to both sides that if they could not agree 
upon a settlement, which after long negotiation seemed to be a fair 
compromise between their conflicting views, the only alternative 
was an arrangement which was less palatable to both. 

" Finally, the Governments of France and Great Britain feel bound 
to reply to the general observations contained in the latter part of 
the United States' memorandum. They know well the sincerity of 
President Wilson's desire for the establishment order providing real 
guarantees against a repetition of the terrible events of the last five 
years. The}' are reluctant to believe that the President can con- 
sider that the modifications which they have made in the memo- 
randum of December ninth can constitute in themselves a justifica- 
tion for a withdrawal from all further cooperation with them in the 
attempt to adjust peaceably the world's affairs. They feel con- 
fident that the explanations contained in this reply will remove any 
misunderstandings as to the nature of the Adriatic proposals. At 
the same time they are deeply concerned that the United States 
should even contemplate the action to which they refer. One of 
the principal difficulties encountered by the Heads of Governments 
during the negotiations of peace was that of reconciling treaty 
obligations with national aspirations which had changed or come 
into being since the date on which the treaties were signed. 
It was obviously impossible to ignore these latter aspirations, many 
of them born during the war, and formulated with unexampled 
clarity and elevation by the President of the United States himself. 
It was equally clearly impossible to ignore treaties, in fact the war 



22 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

began in order to enforce upon Germany respect for the solemn 
treaty she had made nearly eighty years before in regard to the 
neutrality of Belgium. It is the task of the statesmen of the world 
to endeavor to adjust national aspirations and ideals, many of which 
are only transitory and ephemeral with one another and with inter- 
national treaties. The difficulty of the task, the patience required 
in order to effect it successfully, the uselessness of endeavoring to 
enforce preconceived ideas on refractory material has been recog- 
nized by the one more clearly than the other and in his address at 
the opening session of the Peace Conference he pointed out how 
impossible it was to expect imperfect human beings and imperfect 
nations to agree at once upon ideal solutions. He made it clear 
that in his judgment the only course before the Peace Conference 
was to do the best it could in the circumstances and to create 
machinery whereby improvements and rectifications could be effected 
by reason and common sense under the authority of the League of 
Nations instead of by resort to war. 

"Accordingly, nut only was the League of Nations established, but 
Article Nine was specially inserted in the Covenant providing that 
the Assembly may from time to time advise us of reconsideration by 
members of the League of treaties which become inapplicable and 
the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might 
endanger the peace of the world, thus an essential part of the Treaties 
of Peace has been the constitution of machinery for modifying and 
correcting those treaties themselves where experience shows it to be 
necessary. The Governments of France and Great Britain, there- 
fore, view with consternation the threat of the United States Govern- 
ment to withdraw from the comity of nations because it does not 
agree with the precise terms of the Adriatic settlement. The diffi- 
culty of leconeiling ethnographic with other considerations is cer- 
tainly not greater in the Adriatic case and does not produce more 
anomalous results than in the case of other parts of the general 
treaties of peace difficulties which were recognized by President Wil- 
son and his colleagues where they agreed to the best settlement 
practicable at the time because their machinery for peaceful read- 
justment had come into being; also ethnologic reasons cannot be the 
only ones to be taken into account is clearly shown by the inclusion 
of three million Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and the proposals so 
actively supported by the United States delegation for the inclusion 
within Poland of great Ruthenian majoiities, exceeding three million 
five hundred thousand in number, to Polish rule. Though the Brit- 
ish representatives saw serious objections to this arrangement, the 
British Government have not thought themselves justified in recon- 
sidering on that account their membership in the League of Nations. 
The Governments of France and Great Britain therefore earnestly 
trust that whatever the final view of the United States Government 
as to the Adriatic settlement may be they will not wreck the whole 
machinery for dealing with international disputes by withdrawing 
from the treaties of 1919 because tneir view is not adopted in this 
particular case. That would be to destroy the hopes now enter- 
tained by countless millions of people all over the world that the most 
enduring and most beneficent part of the Treaty of Peace was the 
constitution of machinery whereby the defects of treaties could be 
remedied and that changing conditions and requirements of man- 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 23 

kind could be adjusted by processes of reason and justice instead of 
by the balancing of armaments and resort to war. The Governments 
ol France and Great Britain cannot believe that it is the purpose of 
the American people to take a step so far-reaching and terrible in 
* at " 0n a g loun d which has the appearance of being so inade- 

"D. Lloyd-George." 
"Miller \xn." 
"Davis." 

President Wilson's Note of February 24. 

The following is the text of the President's note of February 24th 
sent ■ m reply to the joint memorandum of February 17 of the Prime 
Ministers of France and Great Britain: 

" Washington, February 24, 1920. 
"The joint memorandum of February 17 of the Prime Ministers 
ot France and Great Britain has received the careful and earnest 
consideration of the President, He has no desire whatever to criti- 
cize the attitude of the Governments of France and Great Britain 
concerning the Adriatic settlement, but feels that in the present 
circumstances he has no choice but to maintain the position he has 
all along taken as regards that settlement, Pie believes it to be 
the central principle fought for in the war that no government or 
group ol governments has the right to dispose of the territory or 
to determine the political allegiance of any free people The five 
great powers, though the Government of the United States consti- 
tutes one ot them, have in his conviction no more right than had 
the Austrian Government to disoose of the free Jugoslavic peoples 
without the free consent and cooperation of those peoples The 
President s position is that the powers associated against Germany 
gave final and irrefutable proof of their sincerity in the war by writ- 
ing into the Treaty of Versailles Article X of the covenant of the 
L-eague ol Nations which constitutes an assurance that all the «reat 
powers have done what they have compelled Germany to do— have 
foregone all territorial aggression and all interference with the free 
political self-determination of the peoples of the world With this 
principle lived up to, permanent peace is secured and the supreme 
object of the recent conflict has been achieved. Justice and self- 
determination have been substituted for aggression and political 
dictation. Without it, there is no security for any nation that 
conscientiously adheres to a nonmilitaristic policy. "The object of 
the war, as the Government of the United States understands it 
was to free Europe from that cloud of anxiety which had hun^ over 
it tor generations because of the constant threat of the use of military 
torce by one of the most powerful governments of the Continent 
and the President feels it important to say again that in the opinion 
ot the American Government the terms of the peace settlement must 
continue to be formulated unon the basis of the principles for which 
America entered the war. It is in a spirit of cooperation, therefore and 
ot desire lor mutual understanding that the President reviews the 
various considerations which the French and British Prime Ministers 
have emphasized in their memorandum of February 17 He is 



24 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

confident that they will not mistake his motives in undertaking to 
make plain what he feels to be the necessary conclusions from their 
statements. 

"The President notes that the objections of the Italians and 
Jugoslavs were made the basis for discarding the project of the Free 
State of Fiume. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the joint 
consent of these two powers should have been required for the sub- 
stitute project. The consent of Italy has been obtained. He does 
not find, however, that the Jugoslavs have also expressed a willingness 
to accept the substitute plan. Are they to be required now to accept 
a proposal which is more unsatisfactory because they have raised 
objections to the solution proposed by the British, French, and 
American Government in the memorandum of December 9 ? The 
President would, of course, make no objection to a settlement 
mutually agreeable to Italy and Jugoslavia regarding their common 
frontier in the Fiume region provided that such an agreement is not 
made on the basis of compensations elsewhere at the expense of 
nationals of a third power. His willingness to accept such proposed 
joint agreement of Italy and Jugoslavia is based on the fact that only 
their own nationals are involved. In consequence, the results of 
direct negotiations of the two interested powers would fall within the 
scope of the principle of self-determination. Failing in this, both 
parties should be willing to accept a decision of the Governments of 
Great Britain, France, and the United States. 

"The British and French Governments appear to find in the 
President's suggestion that the latest proposals would pave the way 
for the annexation of the city of Fiume, an implication that the guar- 
antee of the League of Nations is worthless and that the Italian Gov- 
ernment does not intend to abide by a treaty into which it has entered. 
The President can not but regard this implication as without basis 
and as contrary to his thought. In his view the proposal to connect 
Fiume with Italy by a narrow strip of coast territory is quite im- 
practicable. As he has already said, it involves extraordinary com- 
plexities in customs control, coast guard services, and other related 
matters, and he is unable to detach himself from the previous views 
of the British and French Governments, as expressed jointly with the 
American Government in the memorandum of December 9, that 'the 
plan appears to run counter to every consideration of geography, 
economics, and territorial convenience.' He further believes that 
to have Italian territory join Fiume would be invite to strife out of 
which annexation might issue. Therefore, in undertaking to shape 
the solution so as to prevent this he is acting on the principle that 
each part of the final settlement should be based upon the essential 
justice of that particular case. This was one of the principles adopted' 
by the Allied and Associated Powers as a basis for treaty making. 
To it has been added the provisions of the League of Nations, but it 
has never been the policy of either this Government or its associates 
to invoke the League of Nations as a guarantee that a bad settlement 
shaH not become worse. The sum of such actions would of necessity 
destroy faith in the League and eventually the League itself. 

"The President notes with satisfaction that the Governments of 
Great Britain and France will not lose sight of the future interests 
and well-being of the Albanian peoples. The American Government 
quite understands that the threefold division of Albania in the British- 



THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 25 

French agreement might be most acceptable to the Jugoslav Govern- 
ment, but it is just as vigorously opposed to injuring the Albanian 
people for the benefit of Jugoslavia as it is opposed to injuring the 
Jugoslav people for the benefit of Italy. It believes that the differ- 
ences between the Christian and Mohammedan populations will be 
increased by putting the two sections under the control of nations 
of unlike language, government, and economic strength. Moreover, 
one part would be administered by the Italian Government which 
is represented on the Council of the League, the other part by the 
Jugoslav Government which has no such representation. Therefore, 
to alter or withdraw the mandate at some future time would be 
well-nigh impossible. 

''Regarding the Treaty of London, the French and British Prime 
Ministers will appreciate that the American Government must 
hesitate to speak with assurance since it is a matter in which the 
French and British Governments can alone judge their obligations 
and determine their policies. But the President feels that it is not 
improper to recall a few of the arguments which have already been 
advanced against this treaty, namely, the dissolution of Austria- 
Hungary, the secret character of the treaty, and its opposition to 
the principles unanimously accepted as the basis for making peace. 
In addition he desires to submit certain further considerations. In 
the northern Italian frontiers agreements have already been reached 
which depart from the Treaty of London line and which were made 
with the understanding that negotiations were proceeding on quite 
a new basis. It has been no secret that the parties to the treaty did 
not themselves now desire it and that they have thus far refrained 
from putting its provisions into effect. In mutually disregarding 
their secret treaty commitments, the parties to the treaty have 
recognized the change in circumstances that has taken place in the 
interval between the signing of the secret treaty and its proposed 
execution at the present time. For nearly eight months, discussion 
of the Adriatic problem has proceeded on the assumption that a 
better basis for an understanding coidd be found than those pro- 
vided by the Treaty of London. The greater part of the resulting 
proposals have already received Italy's assent. These proposals in 
some cases affected territory beyond the Treaty of London line, as 
in thd Tarvis and Sexton Valleys; in others, the territory fell short 
of the Treaty of London line, as in the case of the islands of Lussin, 
Unie, Lissa, and Pelagosa —to mention only a few of the many pro- 
posals upon which tentative agreements have long been reached 
and which would be upset by an application of the treaty at this 
late day. 

" The coupling of the treaty of London as an obligatory alternative 
to the Adriatic settlement proposed on January 14 came as a surprise 
to the American Government because this Government had already 
by the agreement of December 9 entered into a distinct understand- 
ing with the British and French Governments regarding the basis 
of a settlement of the question. By their action of January 14 the 
Government of the United States was confronted with a definitive 
solution, to which was added on January 20 a threat to fall back upon 
the terms of the treaty of London. This course was followed with- 
out any attempt to seek the views of this Government or to provide 



26 THE ADRIATIC QUESTION. 

such opportunity of discussion as was easily arranged in many other 
matters dealt with in the same period. 

"The President notes that the memorandum of February 17 refers 
to the difficulty of reconciling ethnographic with other considerations 
in making territorial adjustments, and cites the inclusion of three 
million Germans in Czechoslovakia and more than three million 
Ruthencs in Poland as examples of necessary modifications of 
ethnographic frontiers. He feels compelled to observe that this is a 
line of reasoning which the Italian representatives have advanced 
during the course of negotiations, but which the British and French 
have hitherto found themselves unable to accept. There were 
cases where for sufficient geographical and economic reasons slight 
deflections of the ethnographical frontier were sanctioned by the 
Conference, and the American Government believes that if Italy 
would consent to apply the same principles in Istria and Dalmatia, 
the Adriatic question would not exist. 

"The American Government heartily subscribes to the sentiments 
expressed by the Governments of Great Britain and France regarding 
Italy's participation in the war. It fully appreciates the vital conse- 
quences of her participation and is profoundly grateful for her heroic 
sacrifices. These sentiments have been repeatedly expressed by the 
American Government. But such considerations can not be made 
the reason for unjust settlements which will be provocative of future 
wars. A course thus determined would be shortsighted and not 
in accord with the terrible sacrifices of the entire world, which can 
be justified and ennobled only by leading finally to settlements in 
keeping with the principles for which the war was fought. The 
President asks that the Prime Ministers of France, Great Britain, 
and Italy will read his determination in the Adriatic matter in the 
light of these principles and settlements and will realize that standing 
upon such a foundation of principle he must of necessity maintain 
the position which he arrived at after months of earnest considera- 
tion. He confidently counts upon their cooperation in this effort 
on his part to maintain for the Allied and Associated Powers that 
direction of affairs which was initiated by the victory over Germany 
and the Peace Conference at Paris. 

"Polk, Acting." 

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